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Legislative and executive translation of the 








The disconnection between the vision of social justice espoused by the 1996 
Constitution and the lived experiences of its subjects presents probably the most 
significant threat to the legitimacy of the South African constitutional order.  The 
justiciable socio-economic rights contained in chapter 2 of the Constitution, which 
were intended as tools with which to bridge this disconnection, are in danger of 
becoming its starkest examples.  If they are to be of any relevance to the masses they 
were designed to serve, the constitutional rights of access to adequate housing, food, 
water, social security, education and health care services require effective and urgent 
translation from conceptually empty and contested “background norms” into 
concrete, claimable legal entitlements.1 
 With a number of notable exceptions, the bulk of South African socio-economic 
rights scholarship to date has focused on the manner in which such translation has 
materialised, or failed to materialise, through the use of the rights in litigation.  Yet it 
is generally accepted that the judicial process is neither the primary nor necessarily 
the preferred site for this translation.  For reasons of institutional legitimacy, 
resources, expertise, capacity and clout, the legislative and executive branches of 
government are typically regarded as being best placed to articulate specific socio-
economic entitlements and to establish the administrative and other processes 
                                               
* A different version of this article was presented at the International Conference on the Realisation of 
the Rights to Health and Development, held in Hanoi from 26-29 October 2009.  The research in the 
article was made possible by a project grant from the Research Committee of the Faculty of Commerce, 
Law and Management at the University of the Witwatersrand.  Thanks to Paul Wayburne for research 
assistance and to two anonymous referees for very helpful comments on a previous draft. 
1 Brand D “Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution” in Brand D & Heyns 
C (eds) Socio-economic Rights in South Africa (2005) 1, 2; 12; Hassim A; Heywood M & Berger J (eds) 
Health and Democracy (2007) 265; Pieterse M “Resuscitating socio-economic rights: Constitutional 
entitlements to health care services” (2006) 22 SAJHR 473, 478; Pieterse M “On 'dialogue', 'translation' 
and 'voice':  A reply to Sandra Liebenberg” in Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Conversations 
(2008) 331, 332. 
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through which these may effectively be claimed.2  Indeed, they are constitutionally 
mandated to do this, as reflected by the State’s obligation under sections 26(2) and 
27(2) of the Constitution to progressively realise socio-economic rights within its 
available resources by taking reasonable legislative and other measures. 
 It is thus understandable that the Constitutional Court’s socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence has thus far focused on endorsing, overseeing and evaluating the 
effectiveness of legislative and executive attempts at translating socio-economic 
rights into reality, rather than of itself fleshing out the constitutional guarantees in 
question.3  But has this been adequate in ensuring meaningful legislative and 
executive translation?  More pertinently, is the general faith in legislative and 
executive translation processes justified? 
 Without letting courts off the hook entirely, this article takes a closer look at the 
extent of legislative and executive translation of the right to have access to health care 
services in terms of section 27 of the Constitution.  It questions the widely held view 
(increasingly echoed by government) that non-enjoyment of this right is due, not so 
much due to shortcomings in the content of health legislation or policies, but rather to 
the State’s inability (due to constraints posed by logistics, resources and capacity) to 
properly implement them.4  While acknowledging the challenges posed by 
implementation, the article establishes a link between a number of these challenges 
and failures of translation.  It points to several instances where the current legislative 
and policy framework pertaining to access to health care services falls short of 
adequately translating constitutional guarantees, and illustrates how these shortfalls 
preclude effective enjoyment of the rights in question.  By doing this, the article aims 
to further infuse debates over the manner and extent to which “political” translations 
of socio-economic rights are subjected to judicial scrutiny. 
 Section 2 below unpacks this article’s understanding of the notion of “translation” 
and considers features of legislative and executive translation processes that impact 
on the effectiveness thereof.  Thereafter section 3 engages with the current extent of 
translation of section 27 of the Constitution, identifies failures of translation and 
interrogates some of the reasons behind these.  Section 4 then shifts the focus to 
judicial evaluations of legislative and executive translation processes and considers 
the extent to which the Constitutional Court’s current approach to socio-economic 
rights adjudication can identify, and correct, translation failures. 
 
                                               
2 Pieterse M “Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights” (2004) 20 SAJHR 
383, 387-88 and authorities cited there; Pieterse (2008) (fn 1 above) 334; Viljoen F “National 
legislation as a source of justiciable socio-economic rights” (2005) 6(3) ESR Review 6, 8. 
3 For criticism of the Court’s conception of its own role in relation to the translation of socio-economic 
rights, see Pieterse (2008) (fn 1 above) 342-45. 
4 See, for example, South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) Report Public Inquiry:  Access to 
Health Care Services (2008) 6; 55-6. 
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2  RIGHTS, NEEDS AND THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE RIGHTS-
TRANSLATION BY LEGISLATURES AND EXECUTIVES  
According to Nancy Fraser, the “politics of need interpretation” involve three 
interrelated processes.  These are, first, a struggle concerning the political validation 
of need; secondly, a struggle pertaining to the definition or interpretation of such 
need; and, thirdly, a struggle over its implementation.5  In South Africa, where the 
struggle over political need-validation successfully resulted in the 
constitutionalisation of justiciable socio-economic rights, we are currently occupied 
with the second and third of these processes, both of which relate to the translation of 
politically validated needs into lived reality.6 
 Of course, the fact that the socio-economic rights in the Constitution are justiciable 
in itself presents an important avenue for this translation.  This is because 
beneficiaries can insist on the satisfaction of their constitutional rights through the 
judicial process.7  Unfortunately, this avenue has proved less effective in South Africa 
than initially anticipated, due to the Constitutional Court’s unwillingness to interpret 
the socio-economic rights in the Constitution as embodying immediately claimable 
individual demands.8 
 But direct reliance on constitutional socio-economic rights in litigation is not the 
only way in which they may be enforced.  The constitutional presence of socio-
economic rights mandates the political branches of government to progressively 
translate them into demandable entitlements.  It also provides substantive guidelines 
for such translation and fortifies translated entitlements against private challenges 
and against future legislative or executive back-scaling.9 
 But what is meant by “translation”?  As Lucy Williams explains, the actualisation of 
a socio-economic right involves three dimensions.  First, a substantive entitlement 
needs to be legally articulated and defined.  Secondly, legal and/or administrative 
mechanisms must be established through which the entitlement may be claimed or 
through which wrongful non-delivery of the objects of the entitlement may be 
challenged.  Thirdly, beneficiaries must be aware of their rights as well as of the 
mechanisms through which to enforce them, and must practically be able to utilise 
                                               
5 Fraser N Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (1989) 163-64, 
as cited and discussed in the South African socio-economic rights context by Liebenberg S “Needs, 
rights and transformation: Adjudicating social rights” (2006) 17 Stellenbosch LR 5, 15-16. 
6 Liebenberg ibid 16-17. 
7 Brand (fn 1 above) 2; Pieterse (2006) (fn 1 above) 477 and authorities cited there. 
8 Pieterse ibid 487; 490. 
9 Brand (fn 1 above) 13; 15; Viljoen (fn 2 above) 8; Williams LA “Issues and challenges in addressing 
poverty and legal rights: A comparative United States / South African analysis” (2005) 21 SAJHR 436, 
439; 447. 
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the above mechanisms in order to secure actual enjoyment of the goods or services 
guaranteed by the entitlement.10 
 The first two dimensions identified by Williams constitute what this article 
understands as “translation” of socio-economic rights, as these work together to 
create statutory or policy-based individual entitlements “of particular persons to 
particular things”,11 which may be demanded by adhering to established processes.  
The third dimension mostly implies what is commonly understood as 
“implementation”, in that it requires of subjects to be aware of entitlements and 
depends on established processes being accessible, workable and responsive to 
individual demands.  But the three dimensions of rights-enjoyment are clearly 
interrelated, in that successful implementation of a substantive right clearly flows 
from, and depends upon, its adequate translation. 
 The respective roles of the legislature and executive in effecting the translation and 
implementation of socio-economic rights are fairly obvious.  The legislature may 
enact statutory socio-economic rights and prescribe the mechanisms for their 
enforcement.  Alternatively, it may delegate such translation to the executive, by both 
enabling and requiring of relevant State departments to flesh out the content of 
entitlements and to establish enforcement processes for them by way of policy.12  
Where this is the case, the executive has a dual role – as secondary translator of socio-
economic rights as well as the body primarily responsible for their implementation. 
 Statutory or policy-based socio-economic entitlements tend to be more specific, 
concrete and easily claimable than the constitutional background norms to which 
they give effect.13  Where they are also justiciable (which is not necessarily always the 
case), they further prove to be significantly easier to enforce judicially than is the case 
with constitutional rights.  This is because courts are more comfortable, within their 
own understanding of the separation of powers, to enforce obligations against the 
political branches that those branches have themselves defined, rather than to both 
define and enforce obligations, as is sometimes required in relation to less specific 
constitutional guarantees.14  Together with the significant advantages occasioned by 
the political branches’ institutional legitimacy, expertise and resources and with the 
possibilities for public involvement and effective enforcement that are inherent to 
legislative and executive processes, these factors appear to justify a strong preference 
for legislative and executive translation over alternative (judicial or other) translation 
processes. 
                                               
10 Williams (ibid) 439.  See also Brand (fn 1 above) 13; Liebenberg (fn 5 above) 17; Martin P “Just 
administrative action: The key to accessing socio-economic rights” (1999) 2(1) ESR Review 9-11; 
Mubangizi JC “Protection of human rights in South Africa: Public awareness and perceptions” (2004) 
29 Journal of Juridical Science 62, 64; Pieterse (2008) (fn 1 above) 334. 
11 Brand (fn 1 above) 13. 
12 Ibid 14; 16; Viljoen (fn 2 above) 8. 
13 Brand (fn 1 above) 14; Viljoen (fn 2 above) 8-9. 
14 Brand (fn 1 above) 14; 16; 23-4; Pieterse (2006) (fn 1 above) 496; Viljoen (fn 2 above) 8. 
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 But several factors impact negatively on the quality and effectiveness of legislative 
or executive translation.  Legislatures and executives face constraints of time, capacity 
and competing priorities, which retard translation and reduce its effectiveness.  
Moreover, they are prone to interest group capture, do not always perceive or 
appreciate the needs of their subjects and often lack the political will to define and 
operationalise obligations that they themselves must heed.15  Translation fails where 
the legislature or executive, for these or other reasons, fail to define socio-economic 
entitlements or to operationalise them.  It is further significantly compromised where 
statutory or policy-based socio-economic entitlements are under-inclusive, rigidly 
defined, unduly limited, narrower than the rights to which they give effect, vague, 
indeterminate, left without appropriate institutional backing or insufficiently 
entrenched.16 
 Limited enjoyment of socio-economic rights may accordingly be the result of 
absent or inadequate translation just as often as it may be ascribable to inadequate 
implementation of adequately translated entitlements.  Importantly, translation 
failures more often than not have little to do with the resource or capacity constraints 
that are often offered as explanation for poor implementation.17  In what follows, I 
argue that many of the shortfalls in current enjoyment of constitutional health rights 
are ascribable to such failures of translation.  
 
3 THE EXTENT OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE TRANSLATION OF THE 
RIGHT TO HAVE ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
A fairly impressive number of legislative enactments aimed at giving effect to the 
constitutional right of access to health care services have been passed since the 
coming into operation of the 1996 Constitution.  To a greater or lesser extent, all of 
these have contributed to the translation of the right, either by clarifying individual 
entitlements and corresponding public or private health sector obligations, or by 
creating a regulatory framework which enables further translation.  Yet, as will be 
shown, significant translation breakdowns continue to hinder access to health care 
services, especially by poor and vulnerable persons in the public health system. 
 This section of the article will first provide an overview of the significant 
translation of section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution that has been achieved, in relation 
to members of medical aid schemes, by the Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998 and its 
                                               
15 For further discussion, see Dixon R “Creating dialogue about socio-economic rights:  Strong-form 
versus weak-form judicial review revisited” (2007) 5(3) Int. J of Constitutional Law 391, 402-04; 414; 
Liebenberg S “Socio-economic rights: revisiting the reasonableness review / minimum core debate” in 
Woolman S & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Conversations (2008) 303, 312; Pieterse (fn 2 above) 387; 
Pieterse (2008) (fn 1 above) 334-35. 
16 See Brand (fn 1 above) 15; Pieterse (2006) (fn 1 above) 497; Pieterse (2008) (fn 1 above) 334-35; 
Williams (fn 9 above) 455. 
17 Dixon (fn 15 above) 403. 
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pursuant regulations.  By way of contrast, it then considers the far more tentative 
(although not insignificant) translation of the right for the broader population, in 
terms of the National Health Act 61 of 2003.  After providing a general description of 
the extent of enforceable entitlements to health care created and operationalised by 
the Act and its accompanying regulations and policy documents, I consider the extent 
to which translation in terms of these instruments has been successful in relation to 
three distinct topics – access to emergency medical treatment, access to termination 
of pregnancy services and access to health care services by non-citizens.  This is 
followed by a brief analysis of the various breakdowns in translation identified in the 
course of this overview. 
 
3.1 Translation for the upper classes:  regulation of medical schemes 
and access to health services in the private sector 
One of the most successful instances of legislative and executive translation of the 
right to have access to health care services, both directly and indirectly (by way of the 
creation of a translation-enabling regulatory framework), relates to the regulation of 
the medical insurance industry.  The Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998 and its 
accompanying regulations have significantly empowered persons in their efforts to 
become members of medical schemes and have enabled members to insist on certain 
forms of medical treatment for themselves and their dependants. 
 Not only does the Act contain the most comprehensive definition of the concept 
“health services” to be found in any South African statute or policy document,18 it 
entitles all persons who are able to afford membership of medical schemes to be 
admitted as members regardless of their “race, gender, marital status, ethnic or social 
origin, sexual orientation, pregnancy, disability [or] state of health”19 and prohibits 
medical schemes from taking into account the members or their dependants’ current 
state of health, or the frequency with which they require health care, when 
determining their membership contributions.20 
                                               
18 Section 1 of Act 131 of 1998 defines “relevant health service” as “any health care treatment of any 
person by a person registered in terms of any law, which treatment has as its object – (a) the physical 
or mental examination of that person; (b) the diagnosis, treatment or prevention of any physical or 
mental defect, illness or deficiency; (c) the giving of advice in relation to any such defect, illness or 
deficiency; (d) the giving of advice in relation to, or treatment of, any condition arising out of a 
pregnancy, including the termination thereof; (e) the prescribing or supplying of any medicine, 
appliance or apparatus in relation to any such defect, illness or deficiency or a pregnancy, including the 
termination thereof; or (f) nursing or midwifery, and includes an ambulance service, and the supply of 
accommodation in an institution established or registered in terms of any law as a hospital, maternity 
home, nursing home or similar institution where nursing is practised or any other institution where 
surgical or other medical activities are performed, and such accommodation is necessitated by any 
physical or mental defect, illness or deficiency or by a pregnancy”. 
19 Section 24(2)(e) of Act 131 of 1998. 
20 Section 29(1)(n). 
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 The Act further entitles members to post-retirement continuation of membership 
of medical schemes and also enables their dependants to remain beneficiaries of 
schemes after the members' death.21  Crucially, when read with its accompanying 
regulations, the Act enables members to insist that their schemes fully cover the costs 
of diagnosis and treatment of a comprehensive and continuously updated list of 
conditions, designated in a schedule to the regulations as constituting prescribed 
minimum benefits that must be made available to all members of medical schemes 
and to their dependants.22 
 The entitlements awarded by the Act and its regulations are operationalised by the  
creation of the Council for Medical Schemes,23 which oversees medical schemes’ 
compliance with the Act and administers a detailed and efficient complaints 
mechanism,24 in terms of which members may, after having exhausted their schemes’ 
internal dispute resolution processes, complain to the Council over, for instance, 
schemes’ exclusion or restriction of membership, or their failure to cover prescribed 
minimum benefits.  The Council may suspend the registration of medical schemes 
who fail to comply with the provisions of the Act or its regulations.25  The Council is 
further involved in making medical aid consumers aware of their rights and recourse 
in terms of the Act and the regulations.26 
 Overall, the Medical Schemes Act and its regulations have been credited for 
significantly broadening access to (mostly high-quality, private sector) medical care 
for members of medical schemes.27  But the Act's effectiveness in ensuring meaningful 
access to private health care services has been significantly hampered by the fact that 
it remains a lone island of translation of the right to access medical care in relation to 
the burgeoning South African private health sector.  In particular, the almost complete 
lack of regulation of the South African private hospital and pharmaceutical industries 
has had the effect that, beyond prescribed minimum benefits, most forms of private 
                                               
21 Section 29(1)(s)-(t). 
22 Section 29(1)(o) read with s 33(2)(a) and with regs 7-9 as well as Annexure A of the General 
Regulations Made in Terms of the Medical Schemes Act GN R 1262 of 20 October 1999.  The 
regulations allow for limited conditions to apply to the enforcement of this entitlement, for instance by 
permitting medical schemes to insist on the use of particular treatment providers.  For more detailed 
discussion of the provisions highlighted here, see Van Wyk C “Access to affordable HIV medicines in 
South Africa:  Patents, parallel importation, generics and medical schemes” (2006) 39 De Jure 1, 21-22. 
23 Section 3 of Act 131 of 1998. 
24 Established and structured by ss 47-50. 
25 For an overview of the complaints process, see Hassim, Heywood & Berger (fn 1 above) 273-74. 
26 See for instance the Council’s detailed Consumer Education Manual – Medical Scheme Member Rights 
and Obligations (30 April 2002) available through http://www.medicalschemes.com (accessed 15 
November 2010). The Council further runs a detailed and user-friendly website (ibid) which explains 
members’ basic entitlements and allows for the online filing and tracking of complaints against medical 
schemes. 
27 Hassim, Heywood & Berger (fn 1 above) 237. 
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medical treatment have become unaffordable to all except the most well-off segments 
of society. 
 Apart from a highly publicised attempt to curb pharmaceutical profit margins, 
which stalled when the relevant price-control regulations were declared 
unconstitutional,28 there has been no legislative or executive action aimed at ensuring 
the accessibility, affordability or quality of private health care services.  Moreover, it 
appears from the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in Afrox Health Care v Strydom29 
that courts are loathe to define socio-economic obligations for the private health 
sector where these would interfere with freedom of contract.30  Absent statutorily or 
judicially defined entitlements, the extent to which consumers of private health 
services enjoy the right of access to health services is therefore dependent on their 
limited ability to assert the right within the confines of particular contractual 
relationships with private health service providers.31 
 Many South Africans are therefore, for the most part, left to exercise their right of 
access to health care services in the public health sector.  Unfortunately, as will now 
be shown, translation of the right in the public sector has been uneven and 
unsatisfactory. 
 
3.2 Translation for the masses:  The National Health Act and 
supporting policy 
For almost a decade after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution and the Department 
of Health’s groundbreaking 1997 White Paper for the Transformation of the Health 
System of South Africa, the health system languished without framework legislation 
anchoring it in the constitutional dispensation.  This severe (and arguably 
unconstitutional32) breakdown in translation finally abated with the coming into 
operation of significant portions of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 in May 2005.  
Yet approximately a third of the Act’s provisions, many of which aim to operationalise 
its substantive provisions, remain unproclaimed at the time of writing.33 
                                               
28 Department of Health Regulations Relating to a Transparent Pricing System for Medicines and 
Scheduled Substances GN R553 (30 April 2004), declared unconstitutional in Minister of Health v New 
Clicks South Africa 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC) for failing to set an appropriate dispensing fee that conformed 
to the rule of law and principles of administrative justice. 
29 2002 (6) SA 621 (SCA).   
30 For criticism of the Afrox decision in this context, see Pieterse M “Indirect horizontal application of 
the right to have access to health care services” (2007) 23 SAJHR 157, 176-177 and authorities cited 
there. 
31 On the various factors that impact negatively on such contract-dependent enjoyment of the right, see 
Pieterse M “Relational socio-economic rights” (2009) 25 SAJHR 198, 201-02; 208-09. 
32 See Pillay K “Tracking South Africa’s progress on health care rights:  Are we any closer to achieving 
the goal?” (2003) 7 Law, Democracy & Development 55, 65; 78. 
33 See also Gray A & Jack C “Health legislation and policy” (2008) 13 SA Health Review 31, 33; 35; 45; 
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 This glaring translation failure notwithstanding, the provisions of the National 
Health Act present the most significant attempts at translation of the right to have 
access to health care services in the public sector to date.  In terms of section 3(1)(e) 
the Minister of Health must, within available resources, “ensure the provision of such 
essential health services, which must at least include primary health services, to the 
population of the Republic as may be prescribed after consultation with the National 
Health Council”.  Then, section 4 of the Act determines: 
“(1) The Minister, after consultation with the Minister of Finance, may prescribe 
conditions subject to which categories of persons are eligible for such free health 
services at public health establishments as may be prescribed. 
(2) In prescribing any condition contemplated in subsection (1), the Minister must 
have regard to –  
(a) the range of free health services currently available; 
(b) the categories of persons already receiving free health services;  
(c) the impact of any such conditions on access to health services; and 
(d) the needs of vulnerable groups such as women, children, older persons 
 and persons with disabilities. 
(3) Subject to any condition prescribed by the Minister [of Health], the State and 
clinics and community health centres funded by the State must provide –  
(a) pregnant and lactating women and children below the age of six years, 
who are not members or beneficiaries of medical aid schemes, with free 
health services;  
(b) all persons, except members of medical aid schemes and their dependants 
and persons receiving compensation for compensable occupational 
diseases, with free primary health care services; and 
(c) women, subject to the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1996 …, 
free termination of pregnancy services”. 
 
In terms of section 5, no one may be refused emergency medical treatment by public 
or private health care providers, workers or establishments.  The Act further contains 
several provisions pertaining to the manner in which health care must be rendered, 
which flesh out patients’ rights to autonomy and bodily integrity.34  Importantly, 
section 6 requires that patients be informed, in a language and manner that they can 
understand, of their health status and available treatment options.  Moreover, section 
12 mandates the wide dissemination of information on, among other things, the kinds 
of health services available; the extent of their availability; procedures through which 
available health services may be accessed; procedures for complaining about delivery 
of available services and the rights and obligations of patients.  The establishment and 
                                                                                                                                              
Hassim A; Heywood M & Honermann B The National Health Act: A Guide (2008) xiii; xxi. 
34 Sections 6-8 of Act 61 of 2003. 
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implementation of transparent, responsive and widely publicised complaints 
procedures is mandated by section 18 of the Act. 
 Unfortunately, further translation of these impressive provisions has thus far been 
woefully inadequate.  In particular, definitions of concepts central to the enjoyment of 
these entitlements are vague or non-existent.  The Act’s definition of “health services”, 
for instance, simply refers back to the relevant constitutional provisions, none of 
which provide any clarity on the content of the concept.  More disabling has been the 
failure of various Ministers of Health to define the concepts “essential health 
services”, “primary health care services” and “emergency medical services and 
treatment” by regulation, as required by the Act in order to enable the enforcement of 
the entitlements embodied by sections 3-5.  Nor have any regulations been 
proclaimed that extend the availability of free health services or that prescribe any 
conditions for access thereto.  Ironically, this latter failure has had the unintended 
positive consequence that those services listed in section 4(3) of the Act are currently 
available unconditionally.35 
 When viewed together with the myriad non-operational provisions in the Act, it 
becomes clear that implementation of several entitlements embodied by the Act has 
been complicated significantly, if not rendered impossible, by translation failure.36  
The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC)’s observation that less than 
half of patients qualifying for free health services under section 4 of the Act actually 
receive them, testifies to the results of this failure.37 
 To be fair, the Department of Health has fairly extensively defined the notion of 
“primary health care” in its 1997 White Paper for the Transformation of the Health 
System of South Africa38 as well as in a subsequent policy document entitled The 
Primary Health Care Package for South Africa - a Set of Norms and Standards (2000).  
But since these are unenforceable policy documents, the definitions and standards 
that they contain do not assist in giving effect to the relevant rights embodied by the 
National Health Act in the same way that would have been the case if they were 
contained in regulations proclaimed in terms of the Act, which would be justiciable.39 
 A further policy document which significantly advances the translation of the right 
to have access to health care services is the Patients Rights Charter (2000) (“the 
PRC”), which predates the National Health Act but compliments its provisions.  The 
PRC contains a comprehensively defined right of access to health care services,40 
                                               
35 Hassim, Heywood & Honermann (fn 33 above) 23fn22. 
36 Hassim, Heywood & Berger (fn 1 above) 234; Hassim, Heywood & Honermann (fn 33 above) xxi; 
22fn21; 23fn22; SAHRC (fn 4 above) 6; 55-6; 
37 SAHRC (fn 4 above) 41. 
38 See specifically section 2.6.2 of the White Paper.  
39 See Hassim, Heywood & Berger (fn 1 above) 232; 234. 
40 It provides as follows: “Everyone has the right of access to health care services that include:  i. 
receiving timely emergency care at any health facility that is open regardless of one’s ability to pay; ii. 
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alongside rights, for instance, to a healthy and safe environment, to participation in 
health-related decision-making, to choice of health providers, to be referred for a 
second opinion, to continuity of care and to complain about health services.  It is 
required for the PRC to be prominently displayed at health facilities,41 and complaints 
procedures regarding non-adherence to its provisions dovetail with those mandated 
by the National Health Act.  The PRC has been credited for making the right of access 
to health care services more tangible for patients, although this has been curtailed by 
its limited reach (it applies only to patients who have been admitted to health care 
institutions and does not enable anyone to demand such admission), by the fact that it 
is not legally enforceable and by continued lack of awareness of its provisions.42 
 Further translation has been effected by policy documents such as the National 
Drugs Policy for South Africa (1996), which determines that drugs at primary health 
care level should be delivered free of charge and contains guidelines for the 
formulation of an Essential Drug List,43 as well as the Batho Pele principles of public 
service delivery.44  Like the PRC these have had a discernible impact in practice, but 
are not themselves legally enforceable and often require further translation.45 
 It is also worth mentioning that government has for several years toyed with the 
idea of introducing a National Health Insurance (NHI) policy in South Africa.  Such a 
policy would dramatically alter the landscape of access to medical treatment, both by 
persons currently reliant on the public health sector and by persons who are 
currently enabled to access health care services in the private sector through private 
medical insurance.  To the extent that the viability of a system of NHI will require the 
rationing of medical services, detailed translation of minimum entitlements to specific 
health services under such a system is arguably central to the endeavour.  However, 
                                                                                                                                              
treatment and rehabilitation that must be made known to the patient to enable the patient to 
understand such treatment or rehabilitation and the consequences thereof; iii. provision for special 
needs in the case of newborn infants, children, pregnant women, the aged, disabled persons, patients in 
pain, persons living with HIV or AIDS patients; iv. counseling without discrimination, coercion or 
violence on matters such as reproductive health, cancer or HIV/AIDS; v. palliative care that is 
affordable and effective in cases of incurable or terminal illness; vi. a positive disposition displayed by 
health care providers that demonstrate courtesy, human dignity, patience, empathy and tolerance; and 
vii. health information that includes the availability of health services and how best to use such 
services, and such information shall be in the language understood by the patient”. 
41 Site visits by a researcher in September and October 2009 confirm general compliance with this 
requirement in public and private hospitals around Johannesburg. 
42 Hassim, Heywood & Berger (fn 1 above) 232; 247; 266-67; Ngwena C & Cook R “Rights concerning 
health” in Brand D & Heyns C (eds) Socio-economic Rights in South Africa (2005) 107, 145; Pillay (fn 32 
above) 71; SAHRC (fn 4 above) 43. 
43 National Drugs Policy (1996) s 4.1; ch 5.  Section 90(1)(d) of the National Health Act empowers the 
Minister of Health to make regulations pertaining to an essential drugs list.  No such regulations have 
thus far been proclaimed. 
44 Published in terms of the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (GN 1459 of 1997). 
45 For further comment on translation in terms of these instruments see Hassim, Heywood & Berger (fn 
1 above) 232; 234; 247; 266-67. 
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despite much public rhetoric surrounding NHI and its ability to realise the right of 
access to medical treatment,46 no formal draft policy has been forthcoming from the 
Department of Health as yet. 
 Overall, it appears that there has been significant translation of section 27 of the 
Constitution in relation to those South Africans who cannot afford to be members of 
medical aid schemes.  However, such translation has for the most part been 
incomplete and, ironically, falls short of the degree of translation evident in relation to 
access to private medical care by beneficiaries of medical schemes.47  The result, as 
the following examples will show, is unequal implementation of translated 
entitlements and unequal enjoyment of constitutional rights. 
(a) Emergency Medical Treatment 
Section 27(3) of the Constitution, which determines that “no one may be refused 
emergency medical treatment”, presents arguably the most direct and immediate 
entitlement to health care services to be found in the Constitution.  However, it still 
requires further translation.  First, it is necessary to formulate sufficiently generous 
and flexible, yet precise, definitions of “medical emergencies” and “emergency 
medical treatment” which will trigger the protection awarded by the provision.48  
Secondly, the positive entitlements and obligations implied by the right need to be 
clearly circumscribed, so as to minimise the potentially devastating consequences of 
inconsistent implementation. 
 This is especially necessary in relation to emergency treatment by private health 
care providers, who are typically loath to provide services to patients who cannot 
guarantee payment.  Whereas the so-called “horizontal” application of socio-economic 
rights against private entities is generally controversial, there is increasing 
acceptance that the right not to be refused emergency medical treatment does bind 
private health care providers.49  However, the extent of their constitutional 
obligations in this regard remains unclear.  The need for these obligations to be 
legislatively clarified is underscored by section 8(3) of the Constitution, which 
indicates that the application of rights in the Bill of Rights against private entities 
should, in the first instance, be facilitated by legislation.  Failing legislative translation, 
                                               
46 For some of the relevant debates see, for instance, Shisana O “A national health system: 
Opportunities and challenges for South Africa” in Botha C & Hendricks M (eds) Financing South Africa's 
National Health System through National Health Insurance (2008) 1,4; Broomberg J “Health reform 
must not destroy private sector” Cape Times (2 June 2009) 9; Van den Heever A “Insurance funding 
model doesn't fit our needs” Cape Times (9 June 2009) 9. 
47 As also asserted in SAHRC (fn 4 above) 56. 
48 See Pieterse M “Enforcing the right not to be refused emergency medical treatment: Towards 
appropriate relief” (2007) 18 Stellenbosch LR 75, 81. 
49 See Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook (5ed 2005) 53; 593; Liebenberg S “South Africa’s 
evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights: An effective tool in challenging poverty?” (2002) 6 
Law, Democracy & Development 159, 163; Pieterse (fn 30 above) 167-68; Pieterse (fn 48 above) 79-80 
and authorities cited there. 
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courts should attempt to give effect to the horizontal obligations implied by rights by 
applying or developing the common law.50 
 Shortly after the coming into effect of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court 
was called upon to demarcate the application of section 27(3) as well as the extent of 
the positive obligations engendered thereby.  Unfortunately, the facts of Soobramoney 
v Minister of Health, KwaZulu Natal51required the Court to approach this task 
negatively, since it had to justify why the right was not applicable in the 
circumstances.  While the Court hence presented a fairly broad and flexible definition 
of medical emergencies as “sudden catastrophes” which “call for immediate 
attention”,52 it was loath to impose positive obligations on the State.  Accordingly, it 
gave an unduly restrictive interpretation of the reach of the provision, which it 
regarded as entailing only an entitlement not to be turned away by an open health 
facility which was able to render appropriate emergency treatment.53  The Court 
further declined to elaborate on any horizontal obligations imposed by the right.54  
This clearly left the bulk of the translation exercise in relation to the reach of positive 
(public and private) obligations entailed by section 27(3) to the political branches. 
 Section 5 of the National Health Act determines that “a health care provider, health 
worker or health establishment may not refuse a person emergency medical 
treatment”.  Read together with the Act’s definitions of “health worker”, “health care 
provider” and “health establishment”, it is clear that the obligations imposed by the 
provision are applicable to both public and private health care providers.  However, 
“emergency medical treatment” is left undefined by the Act, section 1 of which merely 
regards “emergency medical treatment contemplated in section 27 of the 
Constitution” as falling within the Act’s understanding of “health services”.  The Act 
then clearly extends a mandate of further translation to the Minister of Health, who is 
empowered to make regulations pertaining to emergency medical care.55  Lamentably, 
no such regulations have yet been forthcoming.56 
                                               
50 Pieterse (fn 30 above) 162-63.  On the possible vindication of s 27(3) through the development of 
the common law, see Pieterse (fn 48 above) 85-9. 
51 1998(1) SA 765 (CC). 
52 Para 36; for discussion, see Pieterse (fn 48 above) 83 and authorities cited there. 
53 Soobramoney para 20.  For criticism see, for example, Brand D “The proceduralisation of South 
African socio-economic rights jurisprudence, or 'what are socio-economic rights for?”’ in Botha H; Van 
der Walt A & Van der Walt J Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 33, 47; 
Liebenberg (fn 49 above) 165; Pieterse (fn 48 above) 84-5; Scott C & Alston P “Adjudicating 
constitutional priorities in a transnational context: A comment on Soobramoney’s legacy and 
Grootboom’s promise” (2000) 16 SAJHR 206, 247-48. 
54 Soobramoney paras 35; 48.  See Pieterse (fn 48 above) 164-65. 
55 Section 90(1)(m) of Act 61 of 2003. 
56 Draft regulations published in the Western Cape in 1999 did contain a definition of emergency care, 
but were never proclaimed.  
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 Instead, translation of section 27(3) has been scattered between several measures 
that apply in different contexts and are legally enforceable to differing degrees.  
Medical aid beneficiaries can obtain treatment for “emergency medical conditions”, 
defined by the Regulations proclaimed in terms of the Medical Schemes Act as “the 
sudden and, at the time, unexpected onset of a health condition that requires 
immediate medical or surgical treatment, where failure to provide medical or surgical 
treatment would result in serious impairment to bodily functions or serious 
dysfunction of a bodily organ or part, or would place the person’s life in serious 
jeopardy”,57 as part of minimum prescribed benefits.  In terms of the PRC, the right of 
access to health care services includes “receiving timely emergency care at any health 
care facility that is open regardless of one’s ability to pay”.  Item 3(b) of the Schedule 
to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
further prohibits the discriminatory refusal of emergency medical treatment.58  
Finally, in response to inconsistent practices by its members, the Hospital Association 
of South Africa has published a draft code of ethics for private hospitals which defines 
“emergency medical treatment” as treatment necessary to stabilise an emergency 
medical condition59 and ethically obliges private hospitals to render such treatment 
without discrimination to patients who present themselves at emergency facilities, 
subject to reasonable subsequent compensation.60  This (significantly limited) 
horizontal obligation is clearly not legally enforceable in its current form. 
 The scattered, often unenforceable and clearly incomplete translation of the 
horizontal dimensions and positive obligations inherent to the right not to be refused 
emergency medical treatment has led to significant inconsistencies in compliance 
therewith, especially in the private health sector.61  The lacunae left by the current 
legislative and regulatory framework enable health providers to restrictively self-
define their horizontal obligations in terms of the right and vest no clearly 
enforceable entitlements in patients.  The SAHRC has accordingly urged further 
translation of the right, warning that “[u]nless there are transparent policies to guide 
[emergency] services that will and will not be provided, unequal distribution, 
                                               
57 Reg 7 of GNR 1262 of 20 Oct 1999. 
58 On the extent of translation of s 27(3) effected by the totality of these measures, see Hassim, 
Heywood & Berger (fn 1 above) 233. 
59 Clause 1 of the Proposed Code of Ethics for Private Hospitals – Hospital Association of South Africa 
(HASA) Private Hospital Review 2008: Examination of Factors Impacting on Private Hospitals (2008) 67, 
which further defines “emergency medical condition” as meaning “(A) a medical condition manifesting 
itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of 
immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in – (i) placing the health of the 
individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in 
serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily 
organ or part; or (B) with respect to a pregnant woman who is having contractions; (i) that there is 
inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospital before delivery, or (ii) that transfer may 
pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman or the unborn child”.  
60 Ibid clause 5; HASA (fn 59 above) 69. 
61 Hassim, Heywood & Honermann (fn 33 above) xv; SAHRC (fn 4 above) 56. 
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constituting a perverse form of rationing and an unequal access to and fulfilment of 
human rights will result by default, or omission, as is presently the case”.62 
 
(b) Access to termination of pregnancy services 
Reproductive health care services are explicitly included in the ambit of section 
27(1)(a) of the Constitution.  In relation to abortion, significant and meaningful 
translation of the right to have access to such services took place in terms of the 
Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996, sections 2-5 of which clearly set 
out the circumstances in which women may request to have pregnancies terminated 
as well as the requirements that must be fulfilled when termination services are 
rendered.63  Moreover, section 4(3)(c) of the National Health Act determines that 
women should be able to access termination of pregnancy services in the public 
health sector free of charge. 
 But despite this clearly defined and circumscribed entitlement, there are several 
reports of inadequate enjoyment of this right.  This is almost entirely ascribed to 
problems of implementation – several studies show low awareness, especially among 
rural women, of the extent of their entitlements in terms of these provisions,64 
whereas the SAHRC reports that only about 50% of designated health facilities are 
currently offering abortion services.65  This latter failure, in turn, is ascribed in part to 
a lack of suitably qualified health practitioners in the public health system and in part 
to the refusal by many health care practitioners, for reasons of conscience, to perform 
terminations.66   
 But both these seemingly logistical factors may at least partly be related to 
problems of translation.  For instance, it may be argued that human resource capacity 
constraints in this context have been worsened by the Department of Health's failure 
to produce regulations pertaining to human resources under section 52 of the 
National Health Act67 as well as by restrictions in the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act on the circumstances in which registered midwives and nurses may 
assist in performing terminations.68  More pertinently, the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act’s silence on the issue of conscientious objection to abortion creates 
                                               
62 SAHRC (fn 4 above) 56. 
63 For discussion, see Ngwena C “Accessing abortion services under the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act: Realising substantive equality” (2000) 25(3) Journal for Juridical Science 19, 32. 
64 Gray & Jack (fn 33 above) 39; Ngwena (fn 63 above) 33. 
65 SAHRC (fn 4 above) 48.  See also Pillay (fn 32 above) 76. 
66 SAHRC (fn 4 above) 48. 
67 See Hassim, Heywood & Honermann (fn 33 above) 73. 
68 In terms of s 2(2) of Act 92 of 1996, terminations may be performed only by registered medical 
practitioners and, in limited circumstances, by registered midwives.  Current draft legislation aims to 
extend midwives' ability to perform terminations and to also allow registered nurses to assist with 
certain terminations. 
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significant ambiguity over the circumstances under which medical professionals may 
refuse to perform terminations.69  This, in turn, leads to inconsistent practices which, 
especially in rural areas, often boil down to de facto denial of access.70 
 This goes to show that, even in relation to clearly defined legislative entitlements, 
translation breakdowns may nevertheless occur where legislation or policy 
inadequately define the scope of obligations incurred by obligation-bearers.  This in 
turn indicates that increased attention should be paid to the translation of horizontal 
obligations incurred in terms of socio-economic rights. 
(c) Access to health services by foreign nationals 
The constitutional rights of access to health care services and emergency medical 
treatment are afforded to “everyone”.  This implies that criteria such as citizenship 
may not pose barriers to access, unless such barriers may be justified in terms of the 
general limitations clause in section 36 of the Constitution.71 
 However, statutory or policy-based elaboration of the right of access to health care 
services are silent on this aspect of the right, with neither the National Health Act, the 
Patients Rights Charter or any other official policy document containing provisions 
pertaining to access to treatment by non-nationals.  Instead, the rights of foreigners 
are spelt out in, respectively, an internal memorandum and a directive by the National 
Department of Health, both of which determine that public hospitals may not insist on 
possession of national identity documentation as prerequisite for access to specific 
kinds of medical treatment, notably antiretroviral and emergency treatment.72  
However, implementation of these directives varies drastically from hospital to 
hospital, with several hospitals insisting on presentation of South African identity 
documentation as an absolute requirement for access.73  
                                               
69 The determination in s 6 of Act 92 of 1996 that women who request termination services should be 
informed of their rights in terms of the Act does impose limited restrictions on rights of conscientious 
objection. 
70 For discussion, see Ngwena (fn 63 above) 39; Ngwena C “Conscientious objection and legal abortion 
in South Africa: Delineating the parameters” (2003) 28(1) Journal for Juridical Science 1, 4; 9-13; 16.  
71 See Pieterse M “Foreigners and socio-economic rights: Legal entitlements or wishful thinking?” 
(2000) 63 THRHR 51, 54-6. 
72 Department of Health Memo: Access to Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, including Antiretroviral 
Treatment (2006) and Department of Health Revenue Directive: Refugees / Asylum Seekers with or 
without Permit BI 4/29 REFUG/ASYL 8 (2007), cited and discussed by Veary J “Migration, access to 
ART and survivalist livelihood strategies in Johannesburg” (2008) 7(3) African Journal of AIDS Research 
361, 368-73. 
73 SAHRC (fn 4 above) 53; Veary (fn 72 above) 367-69.  All public hospitals in Gauteng require 
presentation of identity documentation upon seeking admission, yet only certain hospitals refuse 
admission or treatment to foreigners who are unable to present such documentation.  See for instance 
the admission requirements of the Johannesburg Academic Hospital, available online through 
http://www.johannesburghospital.org.za (accessed 15 November 2010). 
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 Foreigners therefore enjoy severely unequal access to services which, by 
Departmental directive, they should be entitled to access.  This is at least partly 
ascribable to the obscure nature and lack of legal status of the relevant directives and 
to the fact that they do not clearly provide for individual entitlements and obligations, 
or for means through which to insist on compliance with these.  
 
3.3 Analysis 
It appears that the current state of legislative and executive translation of section 27 
of the Constitution is, at best, incomplete.  In many instances the legislation or policy 
required to realise particular aspects of the right has simply not been drafted or 
proclaimed.  In other cases, key concepts in legislation and policy have either been left 
undefined or have been defined vaguely and generally.  Moreover, entitlements and 
corresponding obligations tend to be contained in documents that are obscure, lack 
official status, are not in final form or are not legally enforceable outside of the 
processes for which they themselves explicitly make allowance. 
 The result is that entitlements to particular forms of medical treatment either do 
not exist, or do exist but cannot be implemented because they are not justiciable or 
because measures to operationalise them have not been devised or finalised, or do 
exist and can be enforced but are haphazardly and inconsistently implemented.  In 
the latter case, this is often because the obscurity, vagueness or inherent 
contradictions to entitlements or obligations lead to incomplete awareness thereof or 
to unwillingness of obligation-bearers to comply therewith;74 or enable duty-holders 
to deny or challenge the validity or enforceability of obligations;75 or create space for 
unguided bureaucratic discretion which leads to inconsistent or unequal 
implementation.76 
 
4  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF TRANSLATION BREAKDOWN 
It has been argued that courts in a constitutional dispensation that incorporates 
rights-based judicial review of state action are well-placed to identify translation 
failures in relation to socio-economic rights, as well as the reasons for such failures, 
and to insist on their correction.77  In particular, the South African Constitutional 
Court’s approach to socio-economic rights adjudication has received some praise for 
                                               
74 Shown by Veary (fn 72 above) 371 in relation to access to antiretroviral treatment by foreigners. 
75 Gray & Jack (fn 33 above) 45.  This was, for instance, the case with regulations aimed at reducing 
medicine prices by capping pharmaceutical profit margins, where poor drafting and inadequate 
consultation of stakeholders resulted in a successful challenge to the regulations (see Minister of Health 
v New Clicks South Africa (fn 28 above) paras 13 (per the Court); 20; 233 (per Chaskalson CJ); 822; 835 
(per Yacoob J)) and led to as yet indefinite delay in their implementation. 
76 See Williams (fn 9 above) 454-55. 
77 Dixon (fn 15 above) 405. 
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the manner in which it leaves the bulk of socio-economic rights-translation to the 
legislative and executive branches, while ensuring that legislative or executive 
translations are constitutionally compliant.78 
 In Government of the RSA v Grootboom79 the Constitutional Court introduced the 
standard of “reasonableness” for review, which it regards as appropriate to test 
legislation aimed at achieving the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights for 
constitutional compliance.  The standard posits several requirements for legislative 
and executive translation.  According to the Court, measures aimed at the progressive 
realisation of socio-economic rights have to be reasonable “both in their conception 
and their implementation”.80  This means that measures have to “clearly allocate 
responsibilities and tasks to the different spheres of government and ensure that the 
appropriate financial and human resources are available [for the implementation of 
the right]”,81 and that legislative measures have to be “supported by appropriate, well-
directed policies and programmes implemented by the Executive”.82  Measures 
further have to be balanced, flexible and inclusive, and have to cater for short, 
medium and long-term needs,83 but especially for the needs of those “whose needs are 
most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril”.84 
 The reasonableness standard was appropriated in relation to health policy in 
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC),85 where State policy on the use 
of anti-retroviral medication to prevent mother-to-child-transmission of HIV was 
challenged.  In addition to employing all elements of the reasonableness test devised 
in Grootboom, the TAC Court held that reasonableness also required socio-economic 
policy to be transparent and to be communicated effectively to all concerned with its 
implementation: 
“In order for it to be implemented optimally, a public health programme must be made 
known effectively to all concerned, down to the district nurse and patients.  Indeed, for a 
public programme such as this to meet the constitutional requirement of reasonableness, 
its contents must be made known appropriately”.86 
The challenged policy was found to be unreasonable, primarily because of the rigid 
and seemingly arbitrary manner in which it restricted the availability of an essential 
drug to a limited number of designated sites, notwithstanding the need and capacity 
                                               
78 Liebenberg (fn 15 above) 319-20; Steinberg C “Can reasonableness protect the poor? A review of 
South Africa’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence” (2006) 123 SALJ 264, 276; 284. 
79 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
80 Para 42. 
81 Para 39. 
82 Para 42. 
83 Para 43. 
84 Para 44. 
85 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 
86 Para 123. 
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to broaden access.  The State was accordingly ordered to remove restrictions on the 
availability of the drug and to “permit and facilitate the use of Nevirapine for the 
purpose of reducing the risk of mother to child transmission of HIV and to make it 
available for this purpose at hospitals and clinics when in the judgment of the 
attending medical practitioner … this is medically indicated”.87 
 The reasonableness approach is clearly useful for identifying and correcting flaws 
in the content of laws and policies aimed at translating socio-economic rights.88  By 
insisting on the rationality, coherence and flexibility of laws and policy, the 
reasonableness analysis is also indirectly capable of correcting blockages in 
translation processes.  This is illustrated by the TAC case, which involved a challenge 
to the content of a policy formulated by an Executive seized by a political agenda of 
Aids denialism, which made effective translation of section 27(1)(a) of the 
Constitution in the area of HIV all but impossible.  The Court’s dismissal of the State’s 
dissident-influenced “concerns” with extending the availability of Nevirapine in the 
course of its reasonableness analysis, and its insistence that the State move beyond 
the impasse and broaden access to the drug, played a significant role in removing this 
blockage.  The judgment signalled an about-turn in the Executive’s official response to 
the HIV pandemic and paved the way for the formulation and implementation of a far-
reaching policy enabling wide-scale access to anti-retroviral medication in the public 
health sector.89 
 However, due to the focus of the reasonableness approach on the content of laws 
and policies, it is less clear whether it can perceive and correct translation failures 
where these result from the failure to pass laws or policies in the first place.  Karrisha 
Pillay has argued that the failure to operationalise legislative provisions by 
proclaiming relevant regulations (such as that which currently impedes the 
implementation of much of the National Health Act) falls foul of the insistence of the 
reasonableness standard that legislative measures be supported by appropriate 
executive programmes and policies.90  The transparency standard inherent to the 
reasonableness approach may further be useful in countering translation failures 
occasioned by obscure and inadequately communicated policies (such as the 
directives on access to anti-retroviral medication by non-citizens).  But where 
translation failures result from ambiguity created by legislative silences (such as that 
in relation to positive obligations imposed by the right not to be refused emergency 
medical treatment or the parameters of conscientious objection to terminations of 
pregnancy), reasonableness is likely to be of limited use. 
                                               
87 Para 135. 
88 Liebenberg (fn 15 above) 319-20. 
89 For further discussion, see Pieterse M “Health, social movements and rights-based litigation in South 
Africa” (2008) 35 Journal of Law & Society 364, 384 and authorities cited there. 
90 Pillay (fn 32 above) 73; 78. 
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 The reason for this is the widely lamented failure of the reasonableness analysis to 
engage with the content of constitutional rights (as opposed to the content of 
measures aimed at giving effect to them).  Without being grounded in a substantive 
understanding of the rights that legislation or policy aims to translate, it is not 
possible for a reasonableness inquiry to identify untranslated aspects of the rights 
and to insist that translation takes place.  This has the effect that only those aspects of 
socio-economic rights that the legislature or executive are willing to translate are 
realised.91  For this reason, several scholars have advocated a more substantive 
reasonableness analysis which involves judicial elaboration of, or engagement with, 
the content of rights and the entitlements that they engender.92 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
“It appears that little specific definition has been given to the right to health care and 
there is a need to clarify and further define what it means in practice and to people’s 
everyday lives.  This requires specification of the minimum levels of service required 
to ensure appropriate access to health care, which is unavailable for the public sector 
although the prescribed minimum benefits package exists for the private sector.”93 
 
This article has shown that unequal enjoyment of the right to have access to health 
care services results not only from inadequate implementation of legislative and 
policy measures, but may also be ascribed to failures to translate the right into 
claimable individual entitlements.  While capacity and resource constraints present 
real hurdles to the implementation of constitutional rights, these are significantly 
compounded where individual entitlements and corresponding obligations have been 
inadequately defined and/or broadcast. 
 The article has presented several examples of such translation failures in current 
South African health law and policy.  Not coincidentally, these are most acute in 
relation to the sector of the community whose enjoyment of socio-economic rights is 
most limited.  Unless the right of access to health care services is to remain a pipe 
                                               
91 For a recent illustration of this in a different context, see Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality 2010 (4) BCLR 312 (CC) paras 47-9, where the Constitutional Court declined to decide 
whether the right of access to adequate housing in s 26 of the Constitution included entitlements to 
sanitation or lighting.  Instead, it decided the applicants' claim to be provided with sanitation and 
lighting in terms of chapters 12 and 13 of the National Housing Code (which was enacted, inter alia, to 
regulate the provision of such services) and held that they were not entitled to the services in terms of 
either, since neither applied to the situation in which the applicants found themselves.  Since the 
applicants did not challenge the provisions of the Code as being inconsistent with the Constitution, this 
was held to exhaust their claim. 
92 See for instance Brand (fn 53 above) 37; 53-4; Liebenberg (fn 5 above) 31-3; Liebenberg (fn 15 
above) 321; Pieterse (2006) (fn 1 above) 487 and authorities cited there; Pieterse (2008) (fn 1 above) 
342. 
93 SAHRC (fn 4 above) 56. 
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dream for the majority of South Africans, the legislature and executive must urgently 
endeavour to correct these failures. 
 Moreover, courts’ current approach to socio-economic rights adjudication appears 
incapable of perceiving and correcting at least some forms of translation failure.  
While their reluctance to dictate translation processes is understandable, it is clearly 
necessary for courts to engage more robustly with legislative and executive efforts to 
give meaning to rights.  
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